This work, in an agency framework, adds to the few literatures on Nigeria by examining the impact of corporate governance on firm financial performance. Using a sample of 64 listed non-financial firms for the period 2002 to 2006, the study is able to capture the impact of the New Code of Corporate Governance released in 2003 on previous findings. Introductory investigations on the Nigerian capital market operations and regulations depict low, but improving, states. Empirically, Panel regression estimates show that board size, audit committee independence and ownership concentration aid performance. Higher independent directors and directors' portion of shares unexpectedly dampen performance, while firms vesting both the roles of CEOs and chairs in the same individual perform better.
Introduction and Problem Statement
The concept of corporate governance looks at the best approach to solve the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard attendant on principal-agent issues. According to Senbet and John (1998) , "corporate governance involves how all stakeholders in the firm attempt to ensure that managers and other insiders adopt mechanisms that safeguard the interests of the stakeholders". In recent times, the term stakeholder has been accorded a broader perspective; it goes beyond its traditional treatment as shareholders to include employees, creditors, government and others, for instance, environmentalists.
Notionally, corporate governance practices are expected to: (a) focus board attention on optimizing the company's operating performance and returns to shareholders, (b) ensures that directors made accountable to shareholders and management accountable to directors (c) both corporate directors and management have a long-term strategic vision that, at its core emphasizes sustained shareholder value. Further, despite differing investment strategies and tactics, shareholders should encourage corporate management to resist short-term behaviours by supporting and rewarding long-term superior returns. In addition (e) information about companies must be readily transparent to permit accurate market comparisons (CalPERS, 2007) .
Organisations like the World Bank, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Banks, Funds, Stock Exchanges of countries, Commonwealth and several others, are giving critical interests to the issue of corporate governance. This is evident in several releases of updated code of corporate governance documents and conferences especially, following scandals witnessed in Adelphia, Enron and WorldCom.
Generally, well-governed firms are expected to have higher profits, less bankruptcy risk, higher valuations and pay out more cash to their shareholders, while reverse holds for poorly-governed firms (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006).
Several studies have established the importance of good corporate governance to enhanced firm performance (Sanda et More importantly, this study covers the era of the new Code of Corporate Governance released in 2003, and therefore the impact of the code can easily be captured. Adenikinju (2005) only succeeded in describing the provisions of the Code, however, due to her sample period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , she was unable to empirically determine the effect of the Code on firm performance, which is part of the issues addressed in this paper.
The broad objective of this study is to establish the impact of corporate governance measures on financial performance of Nigerian listed firms. Specifically, the study gives an overview of structure and development in the Nigerian capital market, the state of corporate governance in Nigeria is discussed, industrial and temporal patterns of governance and performance indicators are examined, efforts are made at establishing the impact of corporate governance measures on the performance of Nigeria listed firms, and finally, some policy issues are articulated.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows; section two contains the background of the study, while section three presents the literature review. Section four is the theoretical framework and methodology while, section five presents the empirical results and analysis, and finally, section six concludes the paper.
Background of Study
The structural characteristics of the capital market and the historical developments of corporate governance in Nigeria are presented in this section.
The Nigerian Capital Market
Participants in the Nigerian capital market include the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), Discount Houses, Development Banks, Investment Banks, Building Societies, Stock Broking Firms, Insurance and Pension Organizations, Quoted Companies, the Government, Individuals and the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) provides the essential facilities for companies and government to raise money for business expansion and development projects (through investors who own shares in the companies) for the ultimate economic benefit of the society. Like all stock exchanges, the NSE is made up of many markets, including a market for new issues (Primary Market), market for existing securities (Secondary Market) and markets for debt securities and equities. The Nigerian stock exchange ( The Second-Tier Securities Market (SSM) was established on 30 th April 1985 to assist small and medium-sized companies that are unable to meet the requirements of the first-tier market (NSE) in raising long-term capital. To encourage the development of the SSM, the stringent conditions for enlistment in the first-tier market were relaxed for indigenous enterprises seeking to raise funds through the SSM.
The major recent developments in the NSE include the following; the transition from the Callover trading system to the Automated Trading System (ATS) on April 27, 1999, the commissioning of the Electronic Business (e-business) platform in July, 2003 and lastly, the trade alert information system launched in 2005 providing text messages on mobile phones of stockholders of any transactions in their stock within 24 hours. These developments are aimed at reducing the information asymmetry and transaction costs associated with stock trading; enhance transparency and curbing unethical practices in the Nigerian capital market Adelegan (2007a).
Features of the Nigerian Capital Market
We discuss the major features of the Nigerian capital market under the following indices: market size, market concentration, efficiency and liquidity
Market Size
Measures of market size considered are; the number of listed securities and their growth rates, the size of market capitalization and its growth rates, and the market capitalization ratio (i.e. the ratio of value of shares listed to GDP). 
Efficiency of the Nigerian Securities Market
In an efficient market, prices fully and correctly reflect all available and relevant information, and security prices adjust instantaneously to new information. Market efficiency operates at three levels, viz: weak market efficiency, semi-strong market efficiency and strong market efficiency (Anyanwu et al, 1997 and Adelegan, 2004) .
There are few studies trying to test the market efficiency of the Nigerian capital market, most of these are tests of the weak form efficiency. Most studies have found the Nigerian capital market to be weakly efficient, while the fewer ones examining the Nigerian capital market efficiency at the semi-strong form found mixed evidence (Adelegan, 2004) .
Among studies that have found the Nigeria capital market to be weakly efficient are Samuel and Yacout (1981) , Ayadi (1983 Ayadi ( , 1984 , Omole (1997) and Olowe (1999) . The following studies however contrast with the latter, Ekechi (1989) and Inanga and Asekome (1992) .
In the semi-efficient form, Emenuga (1989) , Oludoyi (1999) , Adelegan (2001) and Adelegan (2007b) find that the Nigerian capital market is not efficient. However, tests on strong-form efficiency are yet to be performed on Nigerian data.
Recently, Adelegan (2004) validates the weak form Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) using serial correlation tests. However, the employed runs test invalidates this finding. These therefore made the author to conclude that we can neither accept nor reject the weak form EMH for the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Further, Adelegan, 2007b shows that board changes have information content which is reflected in share price behaviour thereby validating semistrong inefficiency status of Nigerian Stock exchange.
2.2.3.
The Liquidity of the NSE The liquidity of a stock market can be defined as the ease with which shares are traded in the market. This can be measured by the two main indices: ratio of the securities traded to the GDP (total value traded-GDP ratio) and the turnover ratio (i.e. the percentage value of shares traded to market capitalization. These are shown in table 2. Table 2 shows an upward trend in the turnover of the NSE, rising from the lowest of N60.3 million in 2002 to the highest value of N470.3 million in 2006, with a period mean value of N228.02million. The value traded-GDP ratio, expressed as a percentage displayed a rising pattern, rising from a low of 0.94% in 2002 to 2.60% in 2006 cumulating to an average value of 2.13%. Equally, the turnover ratio exhibited an upward trend during the study period, rising from a low value of 7.89% in 2002 to a high of 9.19% in 2006 with an average value of 9.14%. These increasing indices provide evidence that the growth of trading activities in the NSE leads the growth of the stock market (capitalisation). Implying that there is an increasing liquidity of the NSE. Therefore, as shown by the total value traded/GDP ratio, the NSE shows low but increasing trading activities.
2.3.
An Appraisal of Corporate Governance in Nigeria Some efforts have been made at espousing corporate governance in Nigeria and each new one is directed at solving newly emerged problems of governance or existing ones that are inadequately addressed by preceding regulations. The Companies and Allied Matters Decree (CAMD) of 1990 as the basic company law lays more emphasis on provisions that engender financial transparency, which was seen as the most pressing need at that period.
Further, consequent on scandals observed in some large corporations like Enron, Aldephia and WorldCom, greater attention has been accorded governance issues to obviate reoccurrence across countries. Nigeria therefore, realizing the need to align with the international best practices identifies board composition and operations as the major weakness in the current corporate governance practice in Nigeria. Hence, the release in 2003 of the code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria by SEC and CAC and Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post Consolidation in 2006 by CBN. Although previous corporate laws in Nigeria attempt at protecting the often-violated shareholders' right, the SEC release on the Conduct of Shareholders Association in Nigeria (2007), more than ever before, is designed to ensure that association members uphold high ethical standard and make positive contributions in ensuring that the affairs of public companies are run in an ethical and transparent manner and in compliance with the code of corporate governance for public companies.
In a survey of Nigeria by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reported in a publication in April 2003, it is shown that corporate governance was at a rudimentary stage, as only about 40% of quoted companies, had recognised codes of corporate governance in place. This is aggravated, as most businesses in the formal sector are not publicly listed. DPC (1999) , in a survey of enterprises in six randomly selected states found that only 13.3% of the enterprises are listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, while 48.5% are limited liability companies. Thus, close to 38% of companies operating in the formal sector operate outside the provisions of the company law and nearly 87% of formal sector businesses may be operating outside the legislation governing the capital market (Oyejide and Soyibo, 2001) .
To evaluate the standard of Corporate Governance in Nigeria, Oyejide and Soyibo (2001) surveyed regulatory agency in Nigeria using the OECD scoring guide. They find out that largely the institutions and the legal framework for effective corporate governance appear to be in existence. However, compliance and/or enforcement appear to be weak or non-existent, this is in consonance with the position of Wilson (2006) . Adelegan (2007a) in her work on Corporate Governance in Nigeria, opines, "Corporate Governance in Nigeria can be viewed as satisfactory based on some measures, volume and turnover ratios are reasonable, the underlying regulations and the powers of the regulatory bodies are modelled on those of UK and the US Securities and Exchange Commission. Disclosure and accounting rules are strict and moderately enforced", she however noted that the market for corporate control is very weak in Nigeria.
The underdevelopment and emerging nature of the Nigeria capital market as characterised by thinness of trading, low market capitalisation, low percentage of turnover level and illiquidity of the market (Adelegan, 2004) notwithstanding, the Nigeria Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) along with other agencies like the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) are still meeting up to the task in their enactment of relevant policy that can foster good corporate governance.
Empirical Review
This section reviews past works that have tried to empirically validate the relationship that exist between measures of corporate governance and firm performance. Several mechanisms of corporate governance have been identified in literature as influencing firm performance. Given below are some of these mechanisms along with their direction of impact on firm performance. These are also summarised in Debt, corporate governance and performance have been linked together. For instance, debt owed to large creditors is expected to improve firm performance, since the creditors tend to see to it that the firm is well managed (Sanda et al, 2005) . Sakai and Asaoka (2003) in a panel data of over 400 Japanese firms find that higher debt-asset ratio improves firm performance. This is consistent with Sanda et al (2005) in the case of Nigeria. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) have however shown that the effect of leverage on firm performance can be techniquedependent. They find higher debt financing to be negatively related to firm performance in a single mechanism OLS regression, but this effect disappears in simultaneous equation estimation.
Institutional shareholding are expected to influence the standard of corporate governance positively and thereby optimize stakeholder value (SEC-CAC, 2003; Gillan, 2001 ). Holmstrom and Kaplan (2005) note the doubling of large institutional investors' share of ownership of U.S. corporation, and according to them, "the large increase in the shareholding of institutional investors means that professional investors -who have strong incentives to generate greater stock returns and are presumably more sophisticated own an increasing large fraction of U.S. Corporation". This view is also confirmed in Chidambaran et al (2007) where a direct relationship is established between institutional shareholding and performance. However, Edwards and Hubbard (2005) find that despite the very substantial growth of institutional ownership of U.S. Corporations in the past 20 years, there is little evidence that they acquire the kind of concentrated ownership positions required to be able to play a dominant role in corporate governance process. In Nigeria institutional investors account for 17.4% of shareholding (Adelegan, 2007a) A link between block holding/ownership concentration and firm performance has been established. Blockholding refers to the proportion of a firms shares owned by a given number of the largest shareholders. A satisfactory measure of ownership structure as a means of indicating control structure must reflect the distribution of both shareholding and shareholders (Teriba et al, 1977) . And a high concentration shares tends to create more pressure on managers to behave in ways that are valuemaximising (Sanda et al, 2005) . A competing view in the literature suggests that concentrated ownership allows undue influence over management to secure benefits that are detrimental to minority stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishiny, 1997; and Teriba et al, 1977) . Sakai and Asaoka (2003) (2005) find firms credit ratings to be negatively associated with the number of blockholders that own at least 5% ownership in the firm, while Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find no relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profit rates. Ownership Concentration is high in Nigeria (Adenikinju and Ayonrinde, 2001), the largest shareholders own an average of 32.65% equity, and an average of 13.42% of equity is owned by directors (Sanda et al, 2005) .
The proportion of outside directors sitting on the board of a firm (board independence) has been proposed to aid firm value. This is based on the arguments that independence is the cornerstone of accountability (CalPERS, 2007) , and directors who are independent of the management strive at Board size and firm performance have been correlated. For instance, it has been found that the smaller the board size, the more efficient it is expected to be (Adelegan, 2007a ). Some studies have been able to confirm the above thesis There is a relationship between directors' shareholding/compensation and firm performance. A well-designed compensation programme should serve to align the interests of executives and employees with those of shareholders (Gillan, 2001 ). In subjecting this to empirical validation, Brown and Caylor (2004) In his effort to show that the stakeholder theory is never a legitimate contender to value maximisation, Jensen (2000 Jensen ( , 2001 propounded the Enlightened Stakeholder Theory which argues that value maximization provide corporate managers with a single objective whereas stakeholder theory directs corporate managers to serve 'many masters'. Moreover, without the clarity of mission provided by a single-valued objectives function, companies embracing stakeholder theory will experience managerial confusion, conflict, inefficiency and perhaps even competitive failure.
The Agency Theory also known as the PrincipalAgent problem deals with the conflict that ensue as a result of the arrangement called firm. It refers to the variety of ways in which agents, linked by contractual arrangements with a firm, influence its behaviour. These may include organizational and capital structure, remuneration policies, accounting techniques and attitudes toward risk-taking. Agency costs are deemed the total cost of administering and enforcing these arrangements (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
Agency theory explains how best to organize relationships in which one party (the principal) determines the work, which another party (the agent) undertakes (Eisenhardt, 1985) . The theory argues that under conditions of incomplete information and uncertainty, which characterize most business settings, the two agency problems of adverse selection and moral hazard arises. The Multi-Task PrincipalAgent Model by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) builds on the traditional agency theory. The multitask Principal Agent theory utilizes a linear principal-agent model which shows that an increase in an agent's compensation in any one task will cause some reallocation of attention away from other tasks. Another principal-agency problem arises in the form of Free Cash Flow. This is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital. The problem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital or wasting it on organisational inefficiencies (Jensen, 1986 ). This version premises on assumption that managers have incentives to cause their firms to grow beyond the optimal size, since this raise their power and compensation. It therefore tries to identify firms activities that are likely to reduce the agency costs associated with free cash flow. Aghion and Bolton (1992) in their seminal paper extended the agency theory to the area of capital structure based on transactions costs and contractual incompletenessIncomplete Contract. The main concerns of the theories are, first, whether and how the initial contract can be structured in such a way as to bring about a perfect coincidence of objectives between the entrepreneur (manager) and the investor. Second, when the initial contract cannot achieve this coincidence of objectives, how the control right can be allocated.
Theoretically, this work premises on the Agency Theory as discussed above. The choice is based on the fact that this theory, more than any other one, highlights and attempts to solve the major conflicts that ensue as a result of the arrangement called firm. Further, its treatment of debt and equity financing makes it most suitable for studying quoted companies' governance and performance structures. The focal input of this theory is the formal proof that the less the fractional ownership of a manager is in a corporation, the more he tends to appropriate larger amounts of the corporation resources in the form of perquisites and the more desirable for the minority shareholders to expend more resources in monitoring his behaviour (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Hence, corporate governance advocates factors like high directors' shareholding and stock options as aids to the first point above, while optimum board size, blockholding, institutional shareholding, leveraging, independent directors and audit members and the separation of the position of chairman and CEO are factors that make possible effective monitoring.
4.2.
Methodology of the study (3) See the sub-section on method of analysis below on why error term u changes to ω under the random effect specification. The above specifications are estimated for each of our four measures of performance, thus, in all we have eight different estimations.
Method of Analysis/Estimation
The descriptive analyses in terms of trends and structures of corporate governance and performances of the sample are first presented for the study period. Since industrial specific effect is expected, equations (2) and (3) are estimated in panel data models (the fixed and random effects models) while the better of the two is decided upon by the Hausman specification tests, heteroscedasticity-consistent estimators are also provided. The Fixed-effect estimator allows it α in (1) to differ across industrial units by estimating different constant for each industry. This is done by subtracting the "within" mean from each variable and estimating OLS using transformed data. 
4.2.3
Study 
Empirical Analysis
This section presents descriptive statistics both on indicators of corporate performance and governance. Also examined are the correlations between corporate performance and governance indicators. Thereafter, the analysis on the impact of corporate governance on performance is carried out. The commercial services and conglomerates sectors record the highest Return on Equity, N21.08 (N10.85) and N20.92 (N9.87) respectively, while construction, N3.18 (N6.88) and building materials, N2.09 (N8.18) paid least per equity.
5.1.

Measures of Corporate Performance
5.2.
Measures of Corporate Governance Table 6 depicts Nigerian listed firms as having a 9-member board on the average. The mean (median) outsider on board is 38% (37.5%), director shareholding is 9.79% (1.29%), and ownership concentration has a mean (median) value of 55.19% (50.00%). Also depicted is that firms are levered to the tune of 4.83% (1.63%) of their share capital. Majority (97.3%) of CEOs are not the chairs of their firms while the average size of firms is N14.3b with a median of N3.24b. By industry, the mean (median) board size is least in the computer sector (6 members) and highest in breweries (12 members). The machinery, textiles, petroleum and breweries have the highest percentages of independent directors of 77.78% (77.78%), 58.78% (60.00%), 56.91% (54.70%) and 52.27% (56.09%) respectively, while commercial services and real estate score the least percentage of 6.44% (10%) and 9.52% (14.29%) respectively. Directors' shareholding is highest in commercial services, 38.55% (50.93%) and least in the real estate sector, 0.34% (0.32%). Ownership concentration on the other hand, primes in the real estate, 98% (98%) and lowest in the publishing industry, 18.43% (11.22%).
The percentages of independent audit members among the industries cluster around 50%, with textile having the highest of 62.38% (66.67%) and Automobile and Tyre having the least value of 45.21% (50%). The most levered industry is breweries 14.99% (13.25%) and publishing is the least levered, 0.65% (0.54%). In terms of size, the breweries sector has the largest mean (median) value of N86.2b (N54.9b) and machinery least, N0.598b (N0.544b). From the foregoing, two important points are worth noting. First, most firms that do well in their governance issues can also be associated with high performance measures, in this class are the Breweries and Petroleum sectors thereby suggesting sectoral fixed-effect of governance on performance. However, in the second case, the trend patterns of most governance indicators are haphazard and inconsistent across sectors as there is absence of synchronization of governance issues. Thus, the question arises whether Nigerian listed firms strive at accomplishing the provisions of any code in the immediate years following the release of such a code.
Correlation Analysis
A preliminary analysis of the relationship between governance and performance indicators was conducted using the results of the Pearson Product Moment Correlation (PPMC) presented in Table 7 below.
Board size is noted to be positively related with all performance indicators, however, significant association are found only in the case with PriceEarning Ratio. A priori, increase in board size at low level is expected to have a positive relationship with performance while at large board size level, a rise in the board size is expected to inversely associate with performance. Increasing board size has the tendency of diversifying the board for better performance. However, the negative and significant relationship of board size with adjusted TQ (by adjusted, we mean firm's performance minus industry median performance value) points to the fact that adjusting for some firms differentials may change the direction of relationship. The regression analyses in later sections would provide a clearer picture. Percentage of outsiders on board co-vary significantly with TQ and P-E but negatively with ROE and ROA, though insignificantly with the latter. Outsiders on board are expected to support unprejudiced decisions that are value-raising. Directors shareholding possess an inverse relationship with performance measures, this relationship is significant with TQ and P-E. This may be expected at some low level of directors' shareholding; however at higher levels of directors' shareholding, a direct relationship is expected. Therefore, a non-linear association is expected between Directors' shareholding and performance, this also holds for Board Size and ownership concentration.
Concentration is observed to positively associate with performance, except for the case of ROE. The relationship with TQ are significant. Higher concentration of ownership is expected to aid performance as large holders pay close attention to the management of their high stakes Percentage of independent audit membership positively correlate with P-E, and ROE. Only the relationship with P -E is significant at 5% level. The relationship is negative (though insignificant) with other performance indicators as well as for almost all the adjusted values. Leverage significantly and positively correlate with performance indicators except ROE. Relationships with adjusted T-Q are significant at 1%. Higher gearing ratio is theoretically expected to enhance performance as creditors attempt to see to the shrewd utilization of advanced credits. Lastly, firm size is positively related with TQ, ROA and P-E , but negatively related with ROE and Adjusted values of TQ, ROA and ROE. However, of significance to note is that larger firms are more productive and they have higher price earning ratio.
Regression Analysis
To verify the impact of the industrial levels of corporate governance on firms' performance, Table 8 below presents the estimation results of equations (2) and (3). F-ratios of the eight different estimations as shown in Table 8 below indicate their significant prediction respectively. However, the TQ and PE models are noted to fit better than the other two, judging from the adj-R 2 . In addition, the Hausman specification test indicates the superiority of fixed effect modelling of the ROE models. However, for the TQ, ROA and P-E models, both the fixed & random effects specifications are statistically indifferent. In terms of significant impacts, directors shareholding is observed to exert a non-linear effects of the TQ model as the negative impact of directors' shareholding at lower level is reversed when it becomes substantial. Thereby suggesting more efficient monitoring roles of directors at their high stake of holdings. Highly levered firms exhibit lower TQ. This is unexpected as credit-giving institutions are supposed to aid performance through supervision of project and credit management. It is likely that the credit institutions in Nigeria fail in their effective monitoring and or such monitoring levels are too low to reflect in firm value. Although combining the roles of a firm chairman & CEO in one person is discouraged by the SEC and CBN codes on the basis that it is likely to adversely affect proper decision making, our findings differ as CEOs who are also the chairs of their firms report higher TQ. A probable explanation is that such CEOs effectively monitor the firms activities especially when they are significant shareholders.
Using ROA as a measure of performance, the effect of board size meets our a priori expectation, as initial increase in the number of persons on the board of Nigerian companies raises ROA, however, beyond a certain point, increases in board size adversely impact on ROA. This is in consonance with Ncube (2006) observation that the larger the board, the more diversified is its capacity for effective monitoring, however, at a certain high level, a large board may distort the flow of quality communication, as also established by Sanda et al (2005) for Nigeria case. Further, the negative impact of outsiders on board may support Gillan (2001a) view that high-powered executives may influence part-time directors into creating a systematic bias towards the management. Increasing ownership concentration initially raises ROA but later reduces it. A likely explanation is that initially at higher concentration shares, pressures are mounted on managers in ways that are valuemaximizing (Sanda et al, 2005) . However, at some high level of ownership concentration, undue influence may be created over management to secure benefits that are detrimental to the firm value (Shleifer and Vishiny, 1997; and Teriba et al, 1977) . CEOs doubling as chairs aid performance, as already established under TQ models. In the P-E models, the effect of independent directors as given under ROA is still established. In addition, independent audit membership significantly aid P-E as the independent members of the audit committee have the tendency to aid in valuemaximising monitoring. The effect of these on P-E is size also observed to be size dependent.
On ROE, board size exerts a non-linear effect on performance as already discussed under ROA, independent directors exert a negative impact and finally, debt is observed to boost ROE. This may that large creditors usually see to it that their funds are appropriately channelled. Moreover, firm, with the knowledge that they may still approach the creditors in the future, strive at prudence. This is consistent with the findings of Sakai and Asaoka (2003) and Sanda et al (2005) .
5.5
Comparison of Findings of this current study and Previous Related Studies on Nigeria
An attempt to see the value added of this study (in terms of its methodological approach and scope) is to compare the findings with those of previous related studies. Table 9 below summarises the findings of this present work vis-à-vis related studies in Nigeria for easy comparisons. An important point to note is that our results are most comparable with those of Sanda et al (2005) as Adenikinju (2005) does not consider the non-linearity effects of some governance mechanisms, which is a likely explanation for some differences in the results of these two previous studies. The major area of divergence between this study and Sanda et al (2005) is the effect of CEO status on performance. They found the process of separating the roles of CEO and Chair as valueenhancing. However, in the current study, our finding is contrary. A likely explanation is that in the immediate years after the release of the Code, firms which have their CEO also doubling as the chair of their boards, employ such status in effective monitoring, thereby leading to enhanced performance. Thus, it seems that the scope of the study, which covers some of the period of the release of the new code, is responsible for the difference observed between this current study and the previous. Generally, the size of boards sitting on Nigerian firms and ownership concentration impact on their performance in an expected non-linear mode. Higher independent directors and directors' portion of shares unexpectedly dampen performance,
• CEO-Chairman duality • Independence of audit membership • Debt independent audit membership aid only the price earning ratio, while firms vesting both the roles of CEOs and chairs in the same individual perform better. Leverage is noted to boost return on equity but dampen firms Tobin's Q Source: Author's investigation and computation
6.
Summary of findings, conclusion and policy lessons Firm governance has both been theoretically and empirically proven to aid performance. This work therefore joins others to verify this using recent data on Nigeria encompassing the era of the newly released code of corporate governance in the country. Our findings show that corporate governance issues are still rudimentary in Nigeria. However, despite a weakly-efficient capital market and regulatory bodies, several commendable efforts have been made at rejuvenating corporate governance.
Our empirical findings on the other hand, show that elements of corporate governance, as used in works of this nature and also stated in the Code of Corporate Governance (2003) for Nigeria, somewhat impact on firm performance, though some in unexpected directions. Results also differ according to the measure of performance employed. Nonetheless, generally, the size of boards sitting on Nigerian firms and ownership concentration impact on their performance in an expected non-linear mode. Higher independent directors and directors' portion of shares unexpectedly dampen performance, independent audit membership aid only the price earning ratio, while firms vesting both the roles of CEOs and chairs in the same individual perform better. Leverage is noted to boost return on equity but dampen firms Tobin's Q. Further, our results are not dependent on the number of years a firm has been listed, however, the firms' sizes in some cases affect the nature of relationships between governance and performance.
Having established the relevance of governance variables of governance variables to firm performance, we recommend the following.
The optimization of board size and composition is desirable for performance especially in a setting like Nigeria with weak takeover market. This should be determined such that decision management and decision control are separated unless decision makers have a significant ownership stake in corporate cash flows. The board size of companies should be big enough to display a good spread of monitoring skills of the board and enhance its effectiveness. However, it should be small enough to allow quality communication within the board. In composition, independent board membership should be encouraged, as this enables directors to act without relying solely on initiatives from a management. Further, there should be periodic meetings, without management, of the independent directors and formal rules or guidelines establishing an independent relationship between the board and management enacted Appropriate incentive scheme tied to performance should be made to increase firm value through valueadding efforts. We suggest that:
Boards can require that CEOs become substantial owners of company stocks. Salaries, bonuses and stock options can be designed to provide big rewards for superior performance and big penalties for poor performance.
The threat of dismissal for poor performance can be made real. But this should be done carefully, lest the public lose confidence in the company. On the part of the managers, efforts should be concentrated on developing and executing a solid long-term business strategy, rather than slavishly focusing on accounting earnings.
However, in designing such an incentive scheme, as pointed out in the literature, it should not be tied to near-term earnings growth since this encourages excessive risk taking as well as business decisions geared towards propping up earnings. Any system in which managers participate in annual profits but not losses can encourage excessive risk taking.
Board members should equally be incentivized; however, such incentives should not make seemingly independent directors support risky investments that are likely to push up share prices, as this may be counterproductive. Lastly, shareholders should have a say in stock-option plans that have the potential to dilute their voting power and wealth.
The mechanism of debt should be exploited by firms desirous of expansion as this aids monitoring process. Though debt also has its own costs, firms need determine their optimal debt-equity ratio in order to maximize returns from such activities. Firms should strive at incorporating governance measures that are value-enhancing. However, noting the diverse availability and direction of impacts of these measures, it is pertinent to harmonise them. For instance the benefits derivable from a good governance measure like increase in directors' shareholding can easily be lost to an indiscriminate expansion of board size.
The regulatory authorities enact and see to the compliance of rules and regulations governing corporations. No doubt, relevant rules are enacted; however, this may not guarantee adoption. Thus, regulatory bodies should ensure that the current organizational architecture of the Nigerian listed companies engenders proper governance. We notice from our regression results that a sizeable number of estimations depict negative influence of board and audit membership independence on performance, this is unexpected, and we therefore urge the authorities to ensure that the boards of Nigerian firms are not expanded for political or other reasons.
In line with the findings of CPZ (2007), our findings show that the relationship between governance, observable and unobservable firms characteristics and corporate performance, is intricate and may not be amenable to a sort on any single governance measure or firm characteristics. Therefore, the same policy prescription on corporate governance is likely to be sub-optimal. Finally, if not in regulation, perhaps in suasion, Nigerian firms should be made to disclose more governance issues in their annual reports for adequate evaluation by current and prospective investors and researchers.
